One Market, One Gatekeeper: Medianet’s Hold on Maldivian Television

For a Maldivian viewer who wants to watch the English Premier League legally, the question is not which television provider offers the better package. In practice, the route leads to one company.

Medianet advertised the 2025/26 Premier League season as available on ICE Network “only from Medianet”. The same company was selected as FIFA’s Maldivian media partner for the 2026 World Cup, with rights covering television, radio, mobile and internet distribution. Its network also carries a wide range of entertainment, news and sports channels across much of the country.

Medianet does not possess a statutory right to be the Maldives’ only pay-television provider. Another nationwide service exists, and Maldivian law permits competing rebroadcasters. But a monopoly does not always arrive through legislation. It can also emerge when one company controls the infrastructure, content and commercial relationships necessary to make competition meaningful.

That is the position Medianet has gradually built. Its advantage rests not on a single exclusive licence, but on a combination of national coverage, early consolidation, established ownership networks, expensive technology and control over the sports rights that many customers value most.

The result is a market in which competition exists on paper, but often becomes much narrower when consumers decide what they actually want to watch.

A Market Built Through Consolidation

Medianet traces its present position to 2005, when Maldives Cable and J-Sat Communications merged. The consolidation brought together two early cable operators and created a provider with the resources to expand beyond Malé.

Over the following years, Medianet moved from analogue broadcasting to digital services, introduced high-definition television and expanded through different distribution systems. It now offers HITS packages in the islands and MSTV in Malé and Hulhumalé, alongside applications for smart televisions and mobile viewing.

Medianet says it reaches 164 islands, representing more than 90 per cent of the country’s inhabited islands. The figure is published by the company and has not been independently audited, but no publicly available competitor data shows another operator with a larger television distribution footprint. 

In the Maldives, geographical reach is more than a marketing advantage. It is one of the largest barriers to competition.

A challenger must obtain regulatory approval, secure channels, negotiate international rights, install or lease transmission infrastructure, distribute set-top boxes and provide customer support across dozens of small and widely separated communities. The cost of doing so must be recovered from a national population that would amount to only a small regional market in many larger countries.

Medianet entered this environment early and had years to build connections, dealer networks and relationships with households, businesses and resorts. A new operator is therefore not simply competing against a monthly television package. It is competing against an established system.

The Rival That Was Removed by Regulation

The strongest challenge to Medianet did not come from another conventional cable company. It came from Dhiraagu, the country’s largest telecommunications provider.

Dhiraagu launched DhiraaguTV using its fibre and broadband infrastructure. By 2022, the company said it had invested more than USD 30 million in television content, channel rights and related systems, excluding the cost of its fibre-to-the-home network. It said the service reached more than 85 per cent of national households and carried around 100 channels. 

Dhiraagu had what most potential challengers lacked: capital, an existing nationwide network and a large customer base. It represented a competitor capable of challenging Medianet on technology, coverage and content. That competition ended because of a regulatory change.

In 2022, the Maldives Broadcasting Commission amended the Rebroadcasting Regulation to prevent companies with foreign shareholders from holding rebroadcasting licences. Dhiraagu, which has foreign ownership, no longer met the eligibility requirements. Its application to renew its licence was rejected.

Dhiraagu challenged the decision in court and obtained an interim injunction. Its board nevertheless decided to close DhiraaguTV and DhiraaguPlay when the licence expired in January 2023, citing regulatory uncertainty and financial losses. 

The restriction was repealed in 2025. Local media reported that a member of the former Broadcasting Commission alleged that the rule had been introduced to remove competitors and create a monopoly. The allegation has not been established by a court or an official investigation, and there is no public evidence that Medianet requested or helped formulate the amendment. 

Yet its effect is not in dispute. A regulatory decision removed the company best placed to challenge Medianet directly. By the time the restriction was reversed, Dhiraagu had already left the broadcasting business.

Medianet did not become a legal monopoly. But its most formidable rival had been eliminated through an ownership rule rather than defeated through competition over prices or services.

Competition Survived, but in a Different Form

Before closing DhiraaguTV, Dhiraagu agreed to lease its IPTV and over-the-top network to the newly licensed SS Network Private Limited. The arrangement allowed former DhiraaguTV customers to move to SSNET while continuing to use the underlying infrastructure.

SSNET initially offered packages ranging from MVR 150 to MVR 450, with its largest package carrying 120 channels. The service demonstrated that another rebroadcaster could operate nationally without constructing an entirely new telecommunications network.

The current service is marketed as SSPLUS and identifies Streamwave Network Private Limited as its owner and operator. Its website continues to contain references to SSNET, but publicly available documents do not clearly explain the corporate transition between SS Network, SSNET, SSPLUS and Streamwave Network. 

SSPLUS advertises service across numerous islands, offers more than 100 channels and provides mobile viewing. It carries local broadcasters, international entertainment and Sony Sports channels. Its presence means Medianet is not literally the only pay-television service available.

But competition cannot be measured by counting providers or channels alone. Two packages can contain a similar number of channels while offering very different products. The decisive question is whether a customer can switch providers without losing the content that prompted the subscription.

For viewers primarily interested in local channels or general entertainment, SSPLUS may be a genuine alternative. For viewers seeking football competitions controlled by Medianet and ICE Network, it is not an equivalent substitute.

That distinction is at the centre of Medianet’s market power.

Football as the Gatekeeper

In pay-television markets, live sport is unusually valuable because viewers want to watch it as it happens. A film or television programme can often be viewed through another platform or at another time. A live match loses much of its value once the result is known.

Medianet has made sports rights central to its offering. Its ICE Network has carried the English Premier League and other international football competitions, while Medianet advertised the 2025/26 Premier League as available only through its platform. 

FIFA’s official media-rights list also identifies Medianet as the Maldivian licensee for the 2026 World Cup across television, radio, mobile and internet. ICE Network is listed as a media partner operating under Medianet’s licence. 

The acquisition of exclusive rights is not inherently improper. Sports bodies commonly sell territorial exclusivity because it raises the value of their broadcasting contracts. Providers may compete against each other during the bidding process.

But once those rights are awarded, competition for the viewer can effectively end. A rival cannot show the same tournament simply by improving its technology or lowering its price. It must acquire a licence from the rights holder, obtain a sub-licence or wait until the rights become available again.

For a Premier League viewer, therefore, Medianet is not merely the largest provider. It controls the product the customer wants to purchase. That is a functional monopoly within a commercially important part of the television market.

Medianet’s World Cup agreement with Public Service Media has allowed matches to be made available free through public broadcasting. This has expanded access to the tournament, but it has not changed the underlying rights structure. Medianet remains the principal Maldivian licensee and determines distribution through its agreements.

It would be too broad to say that Medianet controls every form of sports broadcasting. SSPLUS carries several sports channels, and different international competitions are governed by separate contracts. But Medianet’s possession of the country’s most valuable football rights gives it a level of influence that ordinary channel comparisons fail to capture.

Prices That Appear Competitive Until Content Is Considered

Medianet’s published HITS packages for the islands cost MVR 162, MVR 300 and MVR 450 per month. In Malé and Hulhumalé, MSTV packages range from MVR 162 to MVR 764. The company also lists separate add-ons, including a Sports+ option. Medianet HITS and MSTV packages

SSPLUS advertises a local package at MVR 150 and a basic package at MVR 300. At the entry level, Medianet’s prices do not appear radically different from those of its competitor.

That comparison, however, does not establish whether the market is genuinely competitive. Published prices do not provide a standardised account of taxes, installation charges, equipment costs, additional screens, picture quality or premium content. Nor do they show how much a household must spend to receive a comparable selection of channels and live sport.

There is also no public information showing Medianet’s cost of obtaining football rights or maintaining its national network. Without that information, it is not possible to determine whether its prices reflect operating costs, market power or a combination of both.

The concern is less that Medianet charges obviously extreme base prices and more that consumers seeking exclusive content have limited power to reject the terms offered. A customer can decline the subscription, but cannot purchase the same licensed coverage from a competing Maldivian provider.

A Competition Law Without a Public Market Test

The Maldives Competition Act prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. It covers conduct including unfair pricing, discriminatory conditions, refusal to deal and actions intended to obstruct competitors.

Holding a dominant position is not unlawful. The legal question is whether a company uses that position in a way that damages competition or consumers.

No publicly available decision has been found showing that Medianet’s market share, sports contracts, pricing or distribution practices have been investigated under the Competition Act. Legal reviews have also noted the absence of published market-share thresholds and detailed merger criteria. 

This leaves the country with a concentrated pay-TV market but no public official assessment of how concentrated it is. Neither the regulator nor the companies publish the subscriber figures needed to measure market shares. There is no transparent analysis of whether exclusive sports contracts prevent effective competition, or whether consumers are paying more because of limited choice.

A De Facto Monopoly, Not a Legal One

Medianet is not a monopoly created by statute. Another nationwide service operates, and the law does not reserve pay-television for a single private company. But the practical market is different from the legal market.

Medianet has the widest claimed reach, a long-established distribution system and exclusive access to football rights that competitors cannot reproduce through lower prices or better technology. Its most capable historical challenger was removed by a regulation that was later repealed. The competitor that replaced DhiraaguTV continues to operate, but does not offer an equivalent substitute for some of the country’s most sought-after sports content.

These conditions support describing Medianet as a de facto monopoly in the most commercially valuable segment of Maldivian pay-television and as the dominant operator in the broader market.

What cannot be established is whether that monopoly power has been acquired or exercised unlawfully. There is no public evidence that Medianet engineered the regulation that removed DhiraaguTV, and exclusive sports contracts are not illegal merely because competitors cannot carry the same matches.

The central failure is one of transparency and oversight. The Maldives does not publish enough information to measure Medianet’s market share, assess its margins or determine whether its content agreements harm competition. Until those questions are examined by an effective competition authority, Medianet will continue to occupy a position that is not protected as a monopoly in law, but often functions like one in the homes of Maldivian viewers.